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[People walking in and saying good morning to each other]

Male 1 Good morning, are all the brothers here?
[Inaudible, Whispering between Male 1 and his assistant]

Major Hisham, do you want the brothers to discuss their own issues separately or talk in general and then start a discussion?

Male 2 [Inaudible, too far from the microphone]

Male 1 Are the departments aware of the operations procedures?

[Inaudible, whispering between Male 1 and his assistant]

Male 1 The commands gave their opinions in the studies and are aware of the operations. We will give our opinions.

Male 3 Mr. Minister, it's not just the operations. Ever since we had the idea of the conference in response to the directions from the President, we've talked to the commands of the air and naval corps about the issues that they want to bring up in the conference.

So when we received the issues that they wanted to discuss, we gave them to the different departments according to their specialties. So we have issues related to operations. Issues related to organization and training are clear, same for the Air Force. All the answers are here now. Our brothers in the Secretariat put them in two sections. One section is for specialties. Everything that has to do with operations that were raised by the corps is in a file. Another section is for commands. Meaning the First Corps Command is raising issues that have to do with operations and some other issues that have to do with administration. It is up to you sir how to manage the meeting. If you want the corps to discuss their issues one by one, then we can have the First Corps start. Their experts are here

Male 1 So we'll start with Air Force Command according to what's in front of me

Male 4 Yes sir. I have the same suggestions. Most of them have been met like the one about the training. But I still have some observations about it. First, the college and the training centers are accepting more applicants; those orders of course came from you and the President. The people that are still there haven't left. Some of them are handicapped and below standards. So while we did address the low numbers in the training

centers, the quality of the people in there is sub par, and that sir is affecting the training. The issue is still current. Turn over is a lot better than it was before thanks to your directions and those of the President.

Male 1 So we can consider the problem solved?

Male 4 Yes sir.

About the second issue, the Army Chief of Staff gave special instructions about usage. You and the President suggested that we should continue training and keeping enough weapons and materials for emergencies and battles that might happen at any time. The usage was continuous and still is, and the equipment issue has improved a little. We're suffering in the training issue. Training has been very minimal in the last two or three months, especially in the bases that are involved in operations on daily basis inside or near the borders. Some times we get a lot of targets. Or we have situations where we think the enemy is amassing and is ready to attack. Some bad weather conditions also prevent training. The training is fine in the rest of the bases, but there are some major bases are experiencing very high and unusual activity, like the Sh'aybia Base, 'Ali Bin Abi Talib Base, Al-Nasiriyyah Base, Abu-'Ubaydah Base, Al-Kut, Al-Bakir, Balad, Al-Hurriyah and Kirkuk. These are the ground attack squadrons that need the training. But the current daily situation that we're experiencing requires attacking the Iranian enemy quickly because of their huge...

Male 1 [Inaudible, talks to someone other than male 4]... Sorry for the interruption

Male 4 We try to balance these issues sir. We are also assigned some other duties that we train for. The pilot's efficiency diminishes if he doesn't get some form of annual training. His confidence in himself and our weapons and what affect they have on the battlefield is all part of the experience. But we have to have other types of training too. The pilot has to know the equipment, night flying, navigation and he needs to practice all the time. If he doesn't practice for a while, he loses his abilities. We are at war, so we don't think that we should sit and relax and just train. We are doing well so far. But the battles that we fight require more effort and our affect on the enemy should hard. Our air forces performed their part before the ground battles.

Male 1 Can't we [Inaudible], there's a lot of pressure on 'Ali Bin Abi Talib Base. The Super Thunder, Mirage, ground attack planes and the airborne forces all use it. So we take a squadron from this base that has four new squadrons, and make it up with a squadron from another base. The squadron we take then go through 40 days of intense training

according to Air Force Command. So we should be able to go through twelve squadrons a year, one squadron a month for different types of training. So we do like we did when we took some forces off the battlefield to train. It also allows them to get back to battle in a short period of time due to the short distance between the line of fire and the training places. It's an idea...

Male 4 Yes sir, we are doing this already. Part of the squadrons in a hot zone was withdrawn to an area like Saddam Base for an example, or to Mosul. But we need more effort from everyone. The air forces need to be highly effective; otherwise the enemy will not take them seriously. The existing squadrons are the ones performing the daily operations. The rest are either new or training in the back because of their poor performance. The way we operate is that sometimes we'll have two working bases and two training bases. Like yesterday, we only had two bases that were operational, Al-Bakir and Kirkuk. They both carried out extensive operations. Three to four trips each. I think the Intelligence Director and the Second Corps Commander said the results were good. It was about 90-94 ground attack missions. All squadrons from both bases participated. The other two bases played a supporting role in air defense and such but we had them train for the most part. Other than that, we have some newly formed squadrons that are performing poorly. But we do have high hopes in more training. The more training the pilot gets, the more confidence he'll have and the higher his morale will be. But this is war sir; we can't say that we are at peace. This point was brought up before, and there was a lot of pressure in the battles etc etc. The situation is a little better now. The Army Chief of Staff gave us a lot of flexibility. He told us to choose our targets from the lists that we receive and to hit the enemy wherever his forces are gathered. We always have a good amount of equipment and ammunition. The coordination that occurs is good. Now we come to our third issue. The amount of warnings that we receive requiring us to be on high alert is high. These high alerts paralyze training. Too many high alerts also create some carelessness. The real readiness is always present. We should always be ready and on alert, especially the air defense. But when an order comes, someone in charge usually is afraid of being blamed if something happens, so he stops everything and starts all the weapons and radars. This equipment has a shelf life. If we turn them on 24 hours it will stop after 1000 hours and we get rid of it. Missiles like Volka and other types are less efficient now compared to before because of the increasing number of high alerts. It happens as a result of people being afraid that something might happen under their command. I was hoping these warnings that come from the intelligence services and other places would happen less

frequently. And I hope they let us evaluate the situation when there's a warning. That was the point I wanted to discuss sir.

Male 1 You know about it. For more than 3 years in General Command, it got to the point that the Head of the General Command said do something and if someone asked you just say Saddam Hussein. Brother Muhammad talked about more flexibility. So, Lieutenant General Hamid, technical evaluation is your responsibility. And the brothers in the higher positions are only being careful. The situation is well known. We don't want to be surprised, that's it. We do understand the geographical location of our country, and the weak spots that can be penetrated from any direction and to any place that has high value targets. You have three sections now...

Male 4 Four, sir

Male 1 Four, the important targets are clear. And the technical brothers know the size of an important target and the probability of a penetration. The enemy tries from time to time to improve his morale. But we've seen that he can only go in a few kilometers to do a hit and run. Attack a mountainous area to hit a couple of targets and then leave. He comes detected. These are some of the situations that we saw in the last couple of years. So preparation should be equal to the possibility. If the possibility is 80% then preparation should be 80%. It should go up and down based on that, taking into consideration different factors like the weather, visual conditions and low clouds on our side or theirs. You get the satellite images

Male 4 Yes sir we get them

Male 1 You determine sometimes that the weather in a certain base is not good, and the same conditions may apply to another base near by. Taking off could be possible because it's easy, but the base might not be suitable for landing. So the technical operation is your responsibility. I know that radars and missiles have a certain age, but part of this war is a war of attrition [Inaudible]

Male 4 There's a point sir that all the brothers are aware of, which is the issue of air defense. In any country in the world, it can't be 100% invincible. Penetration is possible even in Russia or America. The plane comes in low and that makes it hard. And thanks to Allah, the penetrations have been rare and ineffective. But people are not ready for an air strike or a hit on a military target. Our air forces are superior, and the enemy's morale is low. But that does

not mean that they want take a risk one day and try to come in with a few planes and attack a target.

But in any case, our planes can go in to any depth and carry out a successful strike using the numbers that we want while they're helpless. Our forces on the front lines know this and see it.

This in general works in our favor. But it did happen a couple of times where a couple of their planes attacked our 4th Corps and injured or killed someone. But that's something that anyone can do. They come in low and go back but they have no affect.

Most of the preparations that take place are on the Israeli side, and we do have some good defense systems like radars and complete defenses. If there's jamming, if they're flying for example over Israel with huge numbers they'll wonder what they're doing.

Anyway, we gave orders to our air defenses to be prepared and on high alert if the order comes or there's a threat of an Israeli attack. It will stay like this until you say otherwise.

Male 1 Here's the thing comrade Hamid, we have a saying that the Arab man carries his weapon his whole life but he might need it for only a minute. We should always be prepared, but there's also similarity in the area. Israel is technologically superior to Arabs. It has an organized army and they use their whole reserve to achieve a quick victory. In all the previous wars, they were aware of them because of the media reporting on it. Except for the last conflict in 1973 when the Arabs kept it as a secret. When they came to us and said that they have something planned and needed help, they never gave us the zero hour, and we helped them as much as we could.

We must look for the superiority points in the Israeli security theory that we all should understand. Meaning that it's already written and documented when Israel declares war. Another Israeli theory is that if the Arabs own a weapon of mass destruction it would threaten the Israeli security. They were expecting that our nuclear reactor would start operating, so they had to destroy it before we could start. That gives them an extra four to five years if we were to be compensated by the international community with a new reactor. An Arab nuclear bomb would neutralize the Israeli nuclear bomb. So what's left is conventional fighting, a small country with five fronts surrounded by enemies [Inaudible]

So what are the consequences that Israel can tolerate from the international outcry that resulted from attacking our nuclear reactor? It will either attack the reactor again or go to 'Akashat complex for technical reasons related to the first issue.

Israel is a country with little depth. The fighter plane... I mean how deep is it now? 60 km? It used to be 36 km before it took the West Bank. Add another 30 km after it took the West Bank, so it's 60 or 66 km. You know more than me about the fighter plane, it can take off and

go over the Mediterranean or the Red Sea because they're international space. So our awareness and preparation should be within these issues also.

Every now and then they do ten air missions at the same time and go within our radars' range, that's an attrition operation. If Saudi Arabia were honest with us, they have AWACS airplanes, and the Saudi situation is different now from what it used to be two years ago.

You can take part of your alert status. Instead of being 100% and finger on trigger, you can have 70% in some areas, and adjust it according to possibilities of penetration.

Male 4 Sir, if only the Saudis and Jordanians can be honest with us, our safety would almost be guaranteed because the distance is long. I mean they just need to let us know ten minutes in advance. Fifteen minutes or half an hour, they can say there are planes coming your way.

We're even in constant communication with the Saudis. The last thing they said was that we're done training them. We did train their people but they're not up to the required standards. I mean they sleep on the job; they're not at war.

The radar site should be operating 24 hours a day and people should be held accountable; there should even be executions if a plane managed to get through undetected. It's a scary thought that a plane could do that and someone should be held accountable. The Saudis are careless. This is why this issue scares us a little bit. After the period was over they told us to leave. So there should be more pressure on them since we did train their people and they have officers in some of their radar sites.

Sir, the Jordanians do not provide us with all the information. A lot of jamming takes place and they say that they don't see it. Where is it coming from? They don't tell us. A couple of days ago I sent them a delegation to discuss this issue after taking permission from the Army Chief of Staff. They don't let us see their radars and sometimes jamming occurs, they promise and then they stall. We even gave them equipment, like the Thompson and opened radar sites for them.

Another weak point that we have is Syria.

Syria is the only danger with no warning whatsoever. And they might allow the Israelis or Iranians to use their air space. The warning is a mere 18 km, meaning that they can be over the target within one minute from the time we are alerted. So we have to be more prepared and more vigilant on the Syrian side.

On the other side, the western side, we have radar sites that give us some kind of warning. It's not enough warning for some bases but it's more than enough for Baghdad. We have three radar systems covering the important targets.

But we're still not 100% sure about Saudi Arabia because their situation is different than ours, but it's still better than before and they understood where we're coming from.

Now we come to the issue of the gulf and the fact that we have no warning system, even our radar wouldn't help if we put it there tomorrow. I mean it would take a minute or two for a plane to come from the gulf and do anything they want. But we always have enough weapons there.

We went to Kuwait two or three times and asked them to give us some radar sites. They stalled and used excuses and straight out refused. The Saudis gave us some and we even went there and trained them but not the Kuwaitis. They have Failaka [an island] and if only they would give us a radar site or two we would be secure. So that's another weak point. We're always required to have weapons there and they're getting

consumed. Especially after the new port arrangements.
So that's the current air defense situation.

Male 1 Let's stop here with Lieutenant General Hamid. We need to ask ourselves a question after evaluating threat sources and how serious they are. Do we increase our teams and imports of radars, increase our effort protecting targets? Or do we allow some sort of flexibility that might do some harm and might not? We have some targets that we should not allow any flexibility in them; we won't accept any attacks on them regardless of radar shelf life. If we have eight radars we can make them sixteen. There are some other targets that are not that important. So your efforts and buying procedures should reflect that fact. Now, can we go and make Kuwait...?

Male 4 We should keep the pressure...

Male 1 We keep up the pressure by talking to them. You do know that Kuwait is scared; Iran officially threatened them with occupation. The other day when Sa'd al-'Abdallah came there was a possibility of some facilitation in Bubian [Kuwaiti island]. Rafsanjani stated right away that they would occupy Bubian and not leave it if they found out that Kuwait is helping Iraq. What is Salim al-Subah [EN: Emir of Kuwait] supposed to do? He has two Brigades. [Unintelligible]. He is scared because any problems would shake his economy that is the basis of his rule. So their policy is balance. He wants to please us, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Do you think that Kuwait isn't helping Hafiz al-Asad? Or Saudi Arabia?

Male 4 It helps them sir

Male 1 Not because they like them. It's the balance policy. Balance between Iraq and Syria. Feeding the Ba'th differences is good for anyone who wants to stay in power.

Male 4 Indeed sir. He said some things and made promises when he was here, and I was even present. I went there as a head of a delegation to collect on his promise, but nothing happened. They changed there; they said why did you come? I briefed you about it sir. We figured that we should keep good relations with them, better than severing our ties. The issue sir is detection. That won't be solved with radars; well it might be solved with mobile radars and other equipment. Radars get consumed also, and getting them from the Russians, especially since most of our radars come from them, is not easy anymore. They give us very little, and according to what they want to give us, not according to our needs. The other radars are additional ones that we use in some cases, especially when there's jamming or radar with a different system. We also have Italian and French. The problem is early warning systems. And we're doing everything we can with England, Italy and everyone else to solve this problem even if

we get something small. It would solve a huge problem, especially with the gulf and Saudi Arabia. We wouldn't need them anymore if that happened.

The last issue we have sir is the problem of paying for weapons. You should know more about this and we always write memos. Some companies are delaying shipment of bombs and important equipment. The Russians are not giving us enough equipment at all. If we were depending on them alone we would've ran out a long time ago. The minister of state is aware of this. We went in different directions and acquired a lot of it, especially from Spain, Chile, Portugal, France and some other eastern entities.

Some of them started sending the equipment without payment in advance. But they stopped doing this when payments were delayed. Of course we know reason behind the financial delays and the late payments. Spain and Chile used to send us weapons before getting paid, we'd get the weapons and they still don't get paid. So now they started delaying shipments. We have 10,000 bombs in Spain and 10,000 bombs in Chile that are ready to be shipped, but they won't do it because of this situation. We do understand the financial troubles sir, but this is our most important issue.

The Russians also started emphasizing advance payment. Some of our weapons are being delayed for too long. We're waiting for them and have planned battles based on having them.

It's a current problem sir, and the rest of the problems are simple

- Male 1** How much money for Spain and Portugal?
- Male 4** I think it's about 20 million sir; I didn't get the exact numbers. But we wrote some memos about them and I sent one yesterday.
We don't have other issues; we're in continued communication with the commands. Thank you sir.
- Male 1** First Corps
- Male 5** Sir if you allow me, the issues in the report right now have been around for two and a half months. Some have been resolved and some haven't. But during that time and especially lately, a new issue arose that I think should be discussed and documented if you approve.
The issue is dealing with the National Union saboteurs. If we can discuss that issue and the work plan devised by the Corps. The Staff Command approved it, but they declined some of our needs. The plan was complete when we made it.
- Male 1** Can I stop you brother Nizar? Some work for brother Muthanna or can brother Nizar speak?
- Male 6** The study next to you sir is complete. And it has a good solution to the Corps' problem. And we don't really have any priorities for the plan.
- Male 1** I think we should meet one on one. There's an opinion at the general Command on how to operate in light of the new situation, and the Corps representative.
- Male 6** In the initial stage yes. After the meeting that we had with you and the Minister of State, we took the notes under consideration and there wasn't anyone. But there was a call with the Corps
- Male 1** Well then I suggest that brother Nizar should take a look at the study. If you like, we can meet tomorrow morning in the Council or here.
Because your issue is big
- Male 5** I need to have a clear discussion and directions concerning this issue sir.
The issue is pending
- Male 1** They're going to eat you in small pieces
- Male 5** No sir, they won't God willing.
- Male 1** Brother Nizar, if I was in your place, and for a very simple reason...

- Male 5** No sir. I think that in spite of the fact that we don't have any organized Battalions except for one under training, we're still in good shape with what we have and if our needs are met. And I think that the upcoming battles will see good results. This issue was expected and I wrote memos about it, I was waiting on the approval before withdrawing it because the work was clear. And the battle that happened because of it was ours 100%. And in spite of using light battalions and helicopters only, and you know that the core of our defense is the Public Army, I think the battles will be good, I'm optimistic.
- Male 1** We in the General Command are not pessimistic. But a general direction as a policy, meaning that the new plan has to prepare for worst-case scenario, what's being drawn against Iraq from all sides, and summarize from it what concerns you in the northern area. That's why there are very clear directions that will make both you and us very happy. And we'll still listen to what you have to say, and I think you'll be comfortable with it. It needs a one on one meeting.
- Male 5** The meeting is very important and I need it badly
- Male 1** If not today, then tomorrow for sure, God willing.
- Male 5** Then back to the proceedings
- Male 1** The other issues
- Male 5** It's not a lot of issues. We're suggesting changing the areas of responsibilities in Darbandikhan Forces Command. It should be under the command of the 2nd Corps in light of the changes that happened in the 2nd Corps area of responsibilities. Also after they took command of east Dijlah and because of the geographical nature of the area and from where battles are run.
What happened is that the Corps decided to split in two. Their Northern Operations Command took an important part from us. But still, logically it's easier to run the battle if Darbandikhan forces were under the 2nd Corps.
As you know sir, Darbandikhan is on our right wing, connected to us through one road that goes through a tunnel. Zilnako and Babukh flank it. Any support forces or battle management is usually in the direction of the 2nd Corps' area. So I still think that the Darbandikhan area is a natural continuation to the 2nd Corps area. And the existence of the natural barriers is making it hard for us to run the battles in Darbandikhan. And some times we might have to...
With the recent development in the stand of the Union's saboteurs,

there's now a possibility of attacks by those people on Darbandikhan area, and from Tinjiro bridge to Shinaras, Idarah, Birki and other directions.

And if any kind of coordination takes place between the Union's people and the Iranians, even if it's not a detailed coordination, it will cause problems for us in the running any major battle in Darbandikhan

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Male 1 A discussion between you and the 2nd Corps commander

Male 5 It was mentioned as an idea but it wasn't discussed because the 2nd Corps didn't approve

Male 1 If brother Army Chief of Staff... I mean as an idea, discussing it is feasible. I suggest a meeting between the commanders of both corps. They discuss their problems and abilities and then report back to you. It initially seems from the geographical aspect that the request is acceptable. But the details and needs have to be researched. So if brother Army Chief of Staff or anyone here thinks...

Male 6 The area of the 1st Corps before the change that happened was a wide area. You know more about it sir. It went from the Iraqi-Syrian borders all the way to the 2nd Corps by the southern area of Darbandikhan. The threat from the Iranians in this area starts in Darbandikhan and goes north to Halabcha, Shwartah, Tanjawin and Haji 'Umran. We made defense preparations in these areas against the Iranians. Sabotage is the only threat north of these areas and all the way to the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish borders. The unit sizes in the 1st Corps area are small compared to other areas. But the size is currently appropriate to face the Iranians in the areas that I mentioned. And we think that our defense arrangements in 23rd, 24th, 7th, 27th and Darbandikhan Forces Command are good and appropriate to the intentions and the size in these areas. The 2nd Corps region is also wide, if it weren't then the command wouldn't have approved a new operations command that shared the responsibility with the right wing of the corps, we took from them the 2nd division and took the 25th Division from the 4th Corps. That was in regards of responsibility compared to the size of the units. There used to be a small force in Darbandikhan to protect it, a few battalions. And we started increasing the force until we formed a command. The size of the units there right now is good and well matched to the current situation. Things could change if the Iranian enemy considered it a main area. Nothing is for sure, there are always fights using the Corps forces or the general command. We'll research it when we feel that it turned into a major area and the Corps don't have enough resources. Darbandikhan is connected with the 1st Corps more than it is with the 2nd, mainly is the main highway from 'Arbah to Shnarah and then to Darbandikhan. And ever since we formed this command, it took a lot of pressure off the 1st Corps and we took from it one of the Iranian enemy attack points. That's the direction of the 23rd Division in Arbil. And we took from them the whole area up to the Iraqi-Syrian borders. So technically they still have Dizzah castle, Banjiwin, Shwartah,

Halabchah and Darbandikhan. That's the direction of the Persian enemy and doesn't concern it. The communication that I referred to in the last study states that we don't have presence in these areas to fight the Iranians. We need to secure some form of communication with these areas, for their administrative facilities, to protect the roads, and give them administrative and defensive support.

The problem is in my opinion... starting the northern operations command and putting it into action will solve a big problem for the 1st Corps.

This is not a problem for the 1st Corps, and that's why we didn't support it. But still, we'll take your direction into consideration and meet with the commanders to study it. We did in fact study it more than once; this isn't the first time brother Nizar the commander of the 1st corps asks for it. We had a joint committee. Even the Corps keeps asking why we keep taking officers from them to participate in the committees.

The main point is that the field point of view is not neglected, although most officers are busy and the command officers are always present and aware of the details. But we'll still keep the Corps' point of view in mind.

Thank you sir.

Male 1 The problems of the northern commanders...

Male 7 There was an assignment recently for General Rahim. They assigned three staff officers to us, and there was an order issued for it. Except for the commander issue but I think there's a candidate for it in the military office.

Male 1 Military office comrades, Rahim, please expedite this.

[Inaudible, male talking away from microphone]

Male 8 Sir, as far as the commander is concerned, I followed up with the issue twice so far. And even yesterday, I called the office and told them to decide independently because the leader might get busy with the agenda.

And I talked to the Chief of Staff and mister Minister about it

Male 1 We'll go over it today God willing. Will it ease things up a little for you in the northern area?

Male 5 The Ta'limiyyat area? Of course sir. It will ease up things on the local security front and also on the direction of 23rd division. There's one point and we consider it a weakness, I used to be able to maneuver with more troops. For example, whenever there was a threat, I used to be able to use the reserve from the 23rd division on other fronts. The other point might be a little complicated. We have to come up with a plan for the light battalions, especially now that the Union is active. I mean most of the effective light battalions working in the Suran area are from the Bahdinan [Kurdish tribe] tribes. And I actually used 14 battalions from the Bahdinan area during the last month. These are going to be under the northern operations command. Meaning that quick operations will have to go through the General Staff. And it's expected that the northern operations commander will try to organize things, like reserve a certain battalion maybe, which is normal. In the mean time I will be shorthanded. For example, when I feel that the temporary command is below certain levels, I'll use the amount of troops that I need. And so far I used fourteen battalions and made some areas weaker.

Another thing is that the Al-Ja'far Command is under our command, but we see a lot of their operations take place in the northern areas. That is a weakness but it is normal. So there will be some delay. I mean whenever there was a threat I used to have the power to use all the troops I needed. But now I have to go through a higher authority and a different commander that might have another opinion and...

Male 1 Will adding newly formed battalions solve part of the problem?

Male 5 The problem will remain sir. We did request it, but the main battalions will stay in the area. I prefer that the battalions working in my area be from the main ones. Because the battalions to be formed in my area will not be strong or effective against the Union people in Al-Sulaymaniyyah and other places, and also because the new battalions will be from the same area, that's clear sir.

On the other hand, if I bring in the Bahdanian tribes and battalions, I'll be able to use them how I want. Even sometimes we have to limit their powers so they're not more brutal than necessary.

So this remains a problem, because the main effort for the tribes and the light battalions is there. So this problem might be solved if there was some flexibility or if the northern operations commander was flexible. But I do expect that in the next few days, the unorganized movements will...

There is another point sir. We are the only Corps that has no reserve. We have five commandos units. Some of them are new. And they were ordered to spread out a few months ago because of the highway bandits. Some of the units are not complete yet. Al-sulaymaniyyah and Talhat. The formation that we made in 15th Division, we made the commandos unit at Al-Harith our reserve unit.

Even the President said when he paid us a visit that each Corps should have from one to three reserve Brigades. We are the ones with no reserve, and we even have some units out for training.

And indeed in the last operation we used the 424th Brigade and three battalions, he had some brigades and battalions pulled out for training and in case they were needed for an operation. And if it wasn't for us using the 424th Brigade in the Surdaj battle, things might have been bad. So in general, we don't have any reserve. We need a reserve brigade if possible.

Another issue that became more important is the fact that we have a hole between the 7th Division and Al-Harith Command in Shurtah. This hole is 15 km wide...

Male 1 Where?

Male 5 Between the 7th Division's left wing and Al-Harith Command in Shurtah. It's the area between Shurtah and Binjwin, in front of Birzanjah. When things were still good with the Union guys, the General Staff approved placing a force of 1000 fighters from the Union in that area. Currently talks were suspended with the Union, at least from one side. And sometimes fighting took place on a wider front. Some of our units holding that hole participated in the Shughul Surdi battle. They can also exhaust the 7th Division wings and Al-Harith

Command, and it is also possible that they contact the Iranian enemy. We have an assessment to cover that hole but we need a brigade and a battalion, and that's not available right now.

Male 1 Do you think they will stay if our relationship worsened?

Male 5 Even if it did sir, these are the places they used to be in to begin with. The area in front of Jirksus that turned into battleground is one of the reasons they came to talk; these bases have become a battleground between the Iranian enemy and us. So they could give us trouble. Sir, lately the saboteurs have been using more numbers when they fight. Meaning that they don't fight using anything less than 250 to 300 fighters, it means an infantry battalion made up of fighters. Another method they use is taking advantage of villages. Especially the villages under mountain cliffs.

One of the ways to deal with this is to have a strike force with tanks or armored vehicles. We do have a lot of armored vehicles. I used to have all the tanks placed in an armored force consisting of two tank regiments and a commandos unit. But now I'm starting to spread them out. We have a lot of reconnaissance companies. But they're all using old machine gun transporters like the 152. So when it sits in a village and depend on the weapon, it will get hit suffer big losses if it's not using a cannon.

So if possible, we want to gradually turn the reconnaissance companies and regiments that we have into cannon regiments, so they can be effective for this type of fighting against the saboteurs. The transporter that has a 14.5 machine gun is not effective.

Male 1 I've always had an opinion, Comrade Jawwad that I don't believe in reconnaissance regiments for divisions. I don't believe in it because of my understanding of the fighting strategy. No Turkman is going to send a reconnaissance regiment, stand behind it and allow you to crush it with an armored force until you reach the main forces. This is a British theory. Fight on non-British land. They'd put barriers with reconnaissance in front of it and blocking forces and other things behind it, and then after that is the main site. So they'd have 50 km to the front. So what's the armored role when it tries to get a feel for hostile armored division in the front?

Back then they didn't have weapon systems to give early warning and let you know what's in front of you, so they resorted to the back and forth using reconnaissance brigades.

At the present time, a tank regiment from an armored brigade can lead an armored attack force at an acceptable depth and height. It can see 15 to 20 km clearly in front of the division, which prevents the commander of the armored division from falling in a trap.

The new radar systems and the cameras on the helicopters can be 300 feet above ground and be able to see 15 km to the front using the zoom function, it can even show a soldier running or a car.

So with our present situation, I think that the reconnaissance regiments in armored divisions should be flexible in order to address brother

Nizar's problem. Especially the PT76 and the 90 mm cannon. They can be spread out as companies to locations to be studied and determined by the corps. It should accompany all the commandos and infantry units for places such as Suradish. They can use rifles and launchers, one of them would probably get hit, but the other armored vehicle or tank will be able to hit with a shell and go in. [Inaudible]

We'll discuss the details further.

They know our situation, so what do they do? They show up with 500 to 700 fighters on four isolated posts. 200 fighters on each one using grenades, rifles, launchers and mortars. They hit the post and destroy it. So they use big numbers against a smaller isolated force. And they expect help to show up. So they sit as far as they can within range and open fire on the support forces as they come at night and crush them on the highway.

But the armored vehicles should come in using big spotlights and illuminating shells to expose the sides of the road; you do this according to your expertise and understanding of the map and the area. So the road to Sirdash will open up quickly using the transporters and armored vehicles.

So I want to tell you that using the method I just mentioned, you should be able to carry out a counter attack easily using heavy machine guns. And there should also be helicopters above, which from what I've seen, haven't been used at the right time.

Male 5 Sir, the weather...

Male 1 The weather shouldn't be an obstacle brother Nizar. Listen to Brigadier General Hakam. Even if it rains, it shouldn't have anything to do with rain

Male 5 No sir. What happened in the Shikh Wisal operation was that we sent out commandos reserve there on helicopters, the helicopter started shaking between 30 and 40 km/hour. The helicopter was being thrown around. [Inaudible]

Male 1 If we use the solution that you want...
For example, the 8th division was under attack, the helicopters said we're not going. When we asked why, they said because it's cloudy and raining. So what if it's cloudy and raining? The clouds are 500 meters above ground. That's the perfect height for the helicopters to fight using a cannon. [Inaudible].
And just so you know, the BO helicopter can fly when everyone else is grounded. And it can do 80 km/hour

Male 5 We only have one BO sir, and I am using it.

Male 1 I'm aware of the 100 and 125 problems. If wind speed is above a certain level they can't fly. [Inaudible]. But the BO does not have a limit. And if our finances improve, the LS isn't affected by wind or weather. It can be 80 km/hour and it will still fly and fight. They don't use the [inaudible] rain and clouds excuses. Just like a car. Whenever things get bad they say, sir we can't see anymore.
So these don't need parts or height.
Our plans have been for a long time, and brother Hakam knows this, more than one commandos unit should accompany PC7 and others in the northern areas, along with the fighter helicopters.
We put one in Shwagirna, one in Sahl Diana, one in Sulaymaniyyah.
Our goal brother Nizar is this, if a force is coming from Kirkuk, it will be too late by the time they get to their destination. So we need armed helicopters and transport helicopters with commandos unit for a quick intervention. The pilots should be able to just get in and take off right away. We also should use the flares more. And we should do night training for shooting like I asked you yesterday.
You remember brother Muhammad Jassam, a year or two ago, after the first year of the war, we used to...
The Israelis in 1967 used to come in with the Phantoms and attack our ground units. You both remember this. So why is it, 20 years later, and with helicopters that travel at a speed less than the speed of sound, we still can't go in and shoot an illuminating shell to turn the area into

daylight and let the fighting helicopters pick their targets at will?
When we were in Al-Bajah and comrade Muhhamad was the corps commander, we shouldn't have shot from 3 km. Let it get to the bottom and stay lit longer, that way it's more effective than if we used it at 1500 or 2000. It turns the area into daylight and helps with the fighting. The war and the conditions in the northern areas made a lot of pilots fly from one point to another using the main highway. Some of the helicopters had good equipment but we need navigation equipment to help us operate in mountains and in bad weather conditions. I hear them now, brother Hamid. Some times I fly when the weather is clear, and you can hear the pilots asking about the situation and say visibility is zero even though it's 4 km. So whenever the wind speed picks up a little, a little fog forms or some clouds show up, they don't want to... This helps the enemy; they know these limitations that the army has. I remember once comrade 'Ali Al-Hasan talked about... [Inaudible] So these people with over 30 years of experience since 1961 excelled their fighting techniques. We need to develop our abilities, and should take full advantage of what we have and our weaponry

Male 1 [Inaudible, gives examples of how some good officers used spot lights and protected them from being damaged by small arms fir]

Male 1 I remember in Al-Mhammarah, I was with brother Kadduri the commander of the 3rd armored Division. I asked about the Political Director. The Division's Chief of Staff begged me and said that they didn't want him. I told him to sit next to me.
I asked him if his radio was working and he said yes.
I told them that whenever the Iranian helicopters came, just aim the tank cannons towards the helicopters. Estimate the distance and fire just below the enemy helicopter. When the pilot wants to be accurate, he has to hover then aim at the tank, then fire the missile and keep watching it until it hits the target. The helicopter is light, just like paper. So when you fire ten 100mm shells, you will make the helicopter shake and vibrate, and that will make it miss the target.
We also told them to set up a trap before daylight. So when the helicopter comes above the trees aiming at the tank, you all hit it at once since you've been waiting for it, you drop it and they retreat.
So there are some things that you only learn through war experience and you won't find them in books.
The Iranian used to come at night; listen to the sound is coming from and shoot in that direction. So they started making recordings and aim the political direction speakers horizontally.
You don't find these things in textbooks.
On the other hand, their methods are... I mean they come in the morning and snipe our soldier who just went out to get a bite.
Mr. President used a saying that we have, the hunter who is not in a hurry can go at the water source and wait for the deer there, because he's guaranteed that the deer will show up to drink water.
So that's what they did, they would snipe our soldiers at the places where they go to drink water.
Life is an earned experience and this war with them needs people with a strong heart and who can think the same way the enemy thinks.
So I vote with you brother Nizar

Male 5 It's a simple matter that should be dealt with by the corps headquarters. The other responsible headquarter can't lead the other weak headquarters.
In the last operation for example, Al-Sulaymaniyyah commander had a semi-handicapped officer, reserve colonel, he had a captain who lost an eye, he was in Intelligence, and had a staff officer who was on vacation. His deputy was the Susah commander who is a staff officer and a first lieutenant. I mean the commander is ok, but the rest are reserve officer, reserve colonel, division command member who is fat and semi handicapped.
The intelligence officer is real good; he lost his eye in one of the battles.

This is the Sulaymaniyyah Command that runs all the sectors. The Susah Command consists of a colonel, a first lieutenant and a staff officer; it runs three popular army units.

- Male 1** So since the situation is this bad, are we going to be bait for Jalal? What's the solution? Assess the situation.
They'll be strong and let Jalal Al-Talbani do as he pleases. Isn't the town theirs? We'll tell the town this; we are fighting the Kurdish battle on the Iraqi side. Can you defend yourselves? Here are some weapons, equipment and money; you defend it, can you? Or go with Jalal. We'll get to it later.
I'll give the Dokan protection force a year's worth of supplies; transportation for people going on vacation can take place using helicopters. And let them take the road.
The 110 young men from the Popular Army who died... you're asking me to secure Dukan and the 24th Division's wing...
[Inaudible, male 1 is talking with someone away from the microphone]
- Male 5** There are some difficulties in some of the areas.
- Male 1** I mean we put units here and there, the young men are between schools, and one of them had a grandfather and his grandson...
- Male 5** The grandfather was killed in that battle, and the grandson...
- Male 1** We need to look out after our comrades in the Popular Army, what is this?
- Male 5** Between 15 and 70, sir
- Male 1** Is it an auction so you can say we have more people in such and such sector?
- Male 5** In this battle sir...
- Male 1** We need to care. If I personally was the commander of the 1st Corps and I was asked about my opinion, I would say we should put forces in Al-Rababiyah, Shuftin and Al-Jwayah. So why are we so hung on Al-Jwayah? Let them sit up there and we'll sit down here and wait for them. I mean how long can we go up and down the mountain? So we should just sit in the village and wait where the resources are, we'll eat from their food, but we will not violate their honor. We'll eat their animals, make them feed our army, eat from their crops. So why are we going up and down the mountain?
But when can we do this? When this war is over, that's when we bring our army and put a battalion in each village.
I remember once in a village, I can't remember its name, they attacked us. Hajji Khir Allah was the governor. So he brought in a company from

the reserve, we gave him two armored vehicles from the 14 Ramadan Regiment, they stayed in the village. They ate from their food, drank from their milk until the village said that they've had enough and that they won't do it again. It was because he didn't leave them anything. I mean the Arab man or the Kurdish man only have their house and crops, so what you do is stay in his house and eat from his crops.

So in my opinion we need to have a meeting just the two of us. I mean looking at these people, you're bringing a bunch of civilians, give them a uniform and give them a rifle. You're saying in the report that they can't even throw a grenade. This is a disaster.

So brother Nizar we have some points. We should keep communicating with our units. And we should always keep a presence in the important areas. The rest of the areas are not necessary. We need to put our forces together and be strong in one place and make them defend themselves. If they want to hurt their own people then let them. Those are Kurdistan's protectors, let them violate their own honors; it's their own people doing it.

Why should I go there to protect, build, train, give and make roads only to be attacked by them? I won't build or send them any protection then, why would I? They don't want it. I try to build for them and they attack us. I build something, they plant a mine. If I build a college they kill the teachers.